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Abstract. Recent studies about Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
performance reveal that the value of an IDS and its optimal operation
point depend not only on the Hit and False alarm rates but also on
costs (such as those associated with making incorrect decisions about
detection) and the hostility of the operating environment. An adaptive
multiagent IDS is proposed in this paper and it is evaluated according
to a promising metric that take into account all these parameters.
This paper shows results of a prototype that clearly point out how
multiagent technology can improve IDS effectiveness.
1 INTRODUCTION
The main task of any detection system is recognizing whether a spec-
ified condition is present or absent [19]. For IDS this condition is an
intrusion attempt. The model to determine whether an intrusion is
present or not could take many forms. Whatever the model is, a de-
tector’s performance can be described by its receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curve. ROC curve is a plot of the detection prob-
ability (H) versus false alarm rate (F). ROC analysis was originally
introduced in the field of signal detection theory in the 50’s [7].
The evaluation of intrusion detection systems (IDS) has begun to
be an active topic over the last years [6] [8] [10] [14]. The 1998 and
1999 DARPA evaluations conducted by the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory [10] , [11] and McHugh’s
critique [14] of such experiments have shown that this area needs
much more research and experimentation before a framework for the
evaluation of IDS effectiveness can be widely accepted.
At present time, the work of [8] is the most complete study about
a formal IDS effectiveness evaluation. They establish that the value
of an IDS depend not only on the ROC curve but also on the costs
and the hostility of the operating environment (as summarized by
the probability of intrusion). They are the first in applying decision
analysis techniques [4] [6] to the field of Intrusion Detection. Their
method uses a decision tree that shows the relationship between the
condition (if there is an intrusion or not), the detector’s report (ex-
istence or not of an alarm), the probability of the detector to make
erroneous reports, the prior intrusion probability and the action taken
by the decision system based on the detector’s report. The action will
be the one that minimizes expected cost.
The decision system will respond or not depending on which ac-
tion minimizes expected cost. Stolfo et al. [18] defined three sets of
costs for IDS: damage, response and operational. Damage cost is due
to detector’s errors. Response cost corresponds to taking some action
upon an intrusion when it is detected. The operational cost is the cost
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needed to run the IDS; it is not relevant to the decision problem con-
sidered here. [8] only considers damage cost. Our approach extends
their model taking into account the response cost.
Multiagent systems have been applied to intrusion detection in the
past. For instance, a methodology that uses intelligent agents to pro-
vide automated intrusion response [3] and an appropriate agent ar-
chitecture [1] was proposed.
Agents look for a complete automation of complex processes act-
ing in behalf of human users [12]. From the Artificial Intelligence
point of view, agents are classified as reactive or deliberative accord-
ing to the external or internal nature of the intelligent behavior. De-
liberative agents often accomplish the so called BDI paradigm [16]
that structures knowledge in three different levels of abstraction: be-
liefs, desires, and intentions.
Intelligent agents are supposed to adapt decision making through
the cooperation with other agents [16]. Human-like typed messages
usually model communication between agents, including performa-
tives inspired in Speech Act Theory (for instance KQML [17]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 ex-
plains the decision model proposed that includes response costs, sec-
tion 3 describes our multiagent model approach and section 4 shows
the results on our prototype using the metric introduced in section 2.
Finally, section 5 finishes with the main conclusions.
2 DECISION MODEL ANALYSIS
The system to be analyzed can be in two possible states. With an
intrusion (I) or without it (NI). The prior probability is represented
by p. The estimation of prior probabilities is familiar to Bayesian
statistics.
An IDS can launch an alarm (A) or not (NA). The ROC parameters
are: the probability of an alarm given an intrusion,        and
the probability of an alarm given no intrusion,        .
Consider a potential IDS which can take some precautionary ac-
tion depending on the likelihood that an intrusion will occur. Tak-
ing precautionary action incurs a cost C irrespective of whether the
intrusion occurs or not. However, if the intrusion occurs and no ac-
tion has been taken, then a loss L is incurred. The expense asso-
ciated with each combination action/inaction and occurrence/non-
occurrence of the intrusion is given in the decision-model contin-
gency matrix shown in Table 1. Figure 1 represents the decision tree
with the sequence of actions (squares) and uncertain events (circles)
that describes the detector’s operation and the responses that can be
taken according to the detector’s report. The costs shown corresponds
to the consequences of the action taken.
Action nodes (squares) are under the decision system control
which decides what branch to follow. Event nodes (circles), are not
Table 1. Decision model contingency matrix.
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Figure 1. Decision tree of the detector’s expected cost
under the decision system control but depend on uncertainty. A prob-
ability distribution represents the uncertainty about which branch
will follow an event node.
Each combination of actions and events is characterized by its
cost. There is a probability of occurrence associated to each uncertain
event. There are three probabilities specified in the tree:
 
 
: the probability that the detector reports no alarm.
 

: the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the de-
tector reports no alarm.
 

: the conditional probability of no intrusion given that the de-
tector reports an alarm.
The last two probabilities account for both possible detector errors,
falsely reporting that there is an intrusion (

) and falsely reporting
that there is no intrusion ( 

).
The expected cost is determined for each event node by taking
the sum of products of probabilities and costs for all of the node’s
branches. The expected cost at a decision node is the lowest expected
cost from among the node’s outgoing branches.
An operation point is defined by a pair (F,H). The probabilities of
the detector’s report are calculated by applying the formula of total
probability:

 
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The probabilities of the system’s state depending on the detector’s
rate are calculated by applying Bayes Theorem [5]:
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The expected cost of each response is calculated by taking the sum
of the products of the probabilities and costs for the node following
the response.
The results of the expected costs are shown in Table 2.
The expected cost given the detector’s report is the expected cost
of the least costly response given the report. So the expected cost
given no alarm is:
	
                      

 
(7)
Similarly, the expected cost given an alarm is :
	
               
 
 
(8)
The expected cost of operating at a given point on the ROC curve
is the sum of the products of probabilities of the detector’s report and
the expected costs conditional on the reports. The expected cost of
operating at an operating point is:
	
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        
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          
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The expected cost per unit loss (M) is:
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It is important to mention that our formulation includes the pos-
sibility that a decision is made to respond or not, regardless of the
detector’s report. This makes this model stronger than others [9] [13]
[15].
Table 2. Expected costs of responses conditional on the detector’s report.
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For a perfect deterministic forecast H=1, F=0, hence


 	 
   (11)
To calculate the expected cost per unit loss knowing only the prior
probability of intrusion, suppose first the decision maker always pro-
tects (equivalent to using a prediction system where the event is al-
ways predicted and for which H = 1 and F = 1), then

 
 	 
 (12)
Conversely, if the decision maker never protects (equivalent to us-
ing a prediction system where the event is never predicted and for
which H = 0 and F = 0) then:


 	 
 (13)
So if the decision maker knows only the prior probability of intrusion
p, M can be minimized depending on whether 
  , or 
 
. Hence, the mean expense per unit loss associated with the only
knowledge of the probability of intrusion is:


 	 
 (14)
We define the value of an IDS prediction to be a measure of the re-
duction in M over 

, normalized by the maximum possible re-
duction associated with a perfect deterministic forecast, i.e.:
 

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(15)
For a predictive system which is no better than the one based on the
probability of intrusion, V = 0; for a perfect deterministic system V
= 1. For a parametric IDS that depends on a threshold 

, the hit and
false alarm rates will also depend on it    

,     

.
Hence V is also defined for each 

, ie     

.
For a given C/L relationship, the optimal value is 


  

.
This metric is very useful because it includes all the relevant pa-
rameters involved in the evaluation of the IDS effectiveness. A simi-
lar metric was proposed in [15] but it did not manage the possibility
that a decision is made contrary to the detector’s report.
3 THE MULTIAGENT SYSTEM
The proposed multiagent system intends to completely automate in-
trusion detection in a distributed way. We assume that several intru-
sion detection techniques can be applied on the same traffic data, and
the performative of those techniques on a specific traffic data can not
be known a priori. We will show that with cooperative autonomous
agents it is possible to compute a dynamic evaluation of the predic-
tive ability of several IDS that would lead to more successful intru-
sion detections.
In our system, agents play different roles: predictor, evaluator
and manager. Although several combinations of these three types of
agents are possible, and they have been tested with different inten-
tions [2], we consider a particular setup according to the intrusion
detection problem: several predictor agents and just one evaluator
agent and one manager agent.
 The main role of a predictor agent is to guess if there is an intru-
sion or not when an evaluator agent asks it for a prediction. Each
of them implements a specific Intrusion Detection technique over
a shared traffic data.
 On the other hand, the goal of evaluator agents is giving proper
weights to predictor agents. Each weight is computed according
to the previous level of success of the corresponding predictor.
Evaluator agents will communicate the result (a binary decision
based on such weighted references) to the manager agent. Evalua-
tor agent are in charge to update dynamically the weights, and the
way this updating is computed is the key factor for improving IDS
effectiveness. It would also make sense to use several evaluator
agents rather than only one, in order to make them able to adopt
different weighting criteria.
 Finally the manager agent has a posteriori information about if
there was really an intrusion or not. An automated post-morten
analysis should be computed by this type of agent. The manager
runs under a training environment in order to make the system
learn. Therefore, the manager agent is able to calculate H, F and
the value V, and it will communicate the results to the evaluator
agent.
An illustrative example of agents interactions is shown in Figure
2.
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Figure 2. Interactions between agents
Since agents are supposed to be acting in behalf of humans, we
can see predictor agents as operators of IDS, evaluator agents as ex-
perts that weight the results from operators, and manager agents as
post-morten analyzers. Agents follow then a human-like reasoning
process based on the BDI architecture, and agent communications
emulate human dialogs through KQML-typed messages like those
shown in Table 3
Agents were built ad-hoc in java, following the abstract execution
cycle of [16]. The BDI-like architecture of our agents consists of
abstract desires that are transformed into explicit goals when external
perceptions are sensed. Each of these goals has an associated generic
plan composed of a sequence of atomic intentions:
 The generic plan of prediction desire is just a sequence of two
intentions: waits until prediction request, computes prediction and
gives prediction.
 The plan corresponding to evaluator agents is formed of the next
ordered set of intentions: wait until decision request, for each pre-
dictor:  asks for prediction, waits for prediction , computes new
decision applying weights on predictions, gives decision to man-
ager, waits for HVF from manager, for each predictor:  computes
new weight of predictor .
 The plan of manager agents consists of a repeating cycle: asks
evaluator for decision, waits for decision from evaluator, computes
HVF, gives HVF to evaluator
The intelligence of the agent system relies on the computations
of evaluator agents related to the weights of predictors according to
the success of previous predictions. The final suggestion from eval-
uator agents directly depend on these weights. Nevertheless, predic-
tor and manager agents show a straightforward behavior rather than
the adaptive reasoning of evaluator agents. Adaptation is achieved
from the dynamic changes operated in the updating computations of
weights.
Our proposal in this publication involves the use of the ratio 
	


	
as a weight in the aggregated sum of predictor agents, although we
intend to apply a more complex computation in the future. Therefore,
the reputation of certain predictor agent would increase if the number
of hit rates became higher, and if the number of false alarm rates
remains in a low level. After updating these weights with the last
results, all of them are normalized, and the corresponding equations
result.
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4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The main goal of this section is to explain how our model of
agents works showing the benefits that dynamic adaptation using
agents can bring to the decision making problem. The value com-
puted through this adaptive reasoning is compared with agents that
evaluates all the predictions with the same behavior ( 
	 ). The prototype was not analyzed against
real traffic but a possible simulation of such data were tested.
Let us explain the experimental setup: many predictor agents (IDS
models), eight in our example, are considered. The event to predict
is the same for all of them, and it consists of an intrusion. We have
tested our prototype against thirty connections. There is a complete
agent cycle for each connection. The eight predictor agents made
their forecast responding to the evaluator request. It makes its sug-
gestion based on the predictions and send it to the manager. Then
it waits for the manager results. When it receives it, re-weights its
agents and ask the predictors for their forecasts over the second con-
nection. This time the suggestion will not be just an average sum of
predictors.
In order to evaluate our prototype’s effectiveness we have made a
couple of experiments. First the model is run without any adaptive
behavior and the predictions are just based on how many models has
predicted the event (average sum). This figure is compared to a cer-
tain threshold 

. The prediction is positive (an intrusion is present in
the system) if the average sum of predictors’ suggestions is greater
than the threshold. The second experiment tests the adaptive agent
proposal. The evaluator agent suggests if there has been an intrusion
or not weighting each predictor each time according to its past suc-
cess. If the weighted sum is over the threshold then the suggestion
confirms that there is an intrusion.
Five different thresholds uniformly distributed were considered in
both experiments (! ! ! !	 !). These are the results:
With the lowest and the highest thresholds the hit rate (H), and the
false alarm rate (F) are the same in both experiments:
 For 

 ! 
   !   !
 For 

 ! 
   !   !	
 For 

 !	 
   !   !
 For 

 ! 
   !   !
The suggestions from the evaluator agent for 

 ! are:
 With a constant evaluation of predictor agents (average sum):
  !   !	
 With an adaptive evaluation of predictor agents (dynamic
weights):   !   !
From these data we observe a similar number of hit rates and a
slightly lower number of false alarms with an adaptive evaluation.
At last, the suggestions from the evaluator agent for 

 ! are:
 With a constant evaluation of predictor agents (average sum):
  !  !
 With an adaptive evaluation of predictor agents   ! 
!
From these data, we can observe more hit rates in the adaptive eval-
uation than in the constant evaluation, but it also appears to be more
false alarms. So at first glance it does not show clearly which alter-
native is better.
The metric of value introduced in section 2 shows the results are
promising. Adaptive approach clearly improves the detection system
behavior as can be seen comparing Figures 3 and 4. Let us explain
first how to read value graphs. 

peaks for users with C/L next to
the probability of intrusion (0.367). At this point  

   

 
  . The envelope function in Figure 3 shows value for all intru-
sions with C/L between 0.143 and 0.750. This illustrates the benefit
of probabilistic predictions over deterministic ones. The probabilistic
approach gives us a wider range C/L for which users have economic
value. The value of the curve for a deterministic forecast would be
no better than that of a single   

 curve, since a deterministic pre-
diction has a single hit and false alarm rate associated with.
The interval with positive value for average sum approach is
! ! and for our adaptive agents proposal is !	 !.


is also higher for the weigthed approach since the maximum is
0.485 for 

 ! and it is 0.374 in the case of the average sum.
Table 3. KQML performatives of predictors, evaluators and managers.
from to speech act what about
Manager Evaluator ask decision traffic data id
Evaluator Predictor ask prediction traffic data id
Predictor Evaluator tell prediction traffic data id
Evaluator Manager tell decision traffic data id
Manager Evaluator tell H, F, V
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Figure 3. Average sum envelope. Economic value versus C/L relationship
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Figure 4. Adaptive agents envelope. Economic value versus C/L
relationship
In practice, the site security officer (SSO) will estimate the C/L
relationship for his system. He will also be able to estimate the prob-
ability of intrusion (p). Let us imagine that, in our example, the C/L
relationship is equal to p. This would give us the maximum value for


 !. In this case, the SSO can say that with a probability of 
his prediction has a value of 	  of the perfect prediction. Based
on this analysis it could be appropriate for him to respond taking
some action (for example, unplugging the system, changing a rule in
the firewall, etc.).
5 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a multiagent system that cooperates in order to
detect intrusions. Some of the agents implement IDS models, other
evaluates the predictions made by the firsts and finally a third kind
of agent considers the evaluator suggestion establishing the IDS ef-
fectiveness. The dynamic weights involved in the adaptive evaluation
performed to generate a final suggestion from several different intru-
sion detection models showing a better performance than classical
approach based on the average sum of the predictions received.
The improvement has been measured introducing a promising
metric that takes into account the response costs. The recent intro-
duction of decision making techniques to intrusion detection reveals
the necessity of formal robust metrics that considers all the parame-
ters involved in the task.
Future work will include testing our prototype with real data in-
stead of synthetic data. This is not an easy task because of the prob-
lems to experiment in real networks and the suspicious results based
on simulated traffic [14].
This paper have shown that adaptive behavior of agents can be
really useful in the intrusion detection field due to the very changing
environment that is faced and the need of automated responses.
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